Duty and Inclination
Morality, according to Kant, consists of categorical, rather than hypothetical, imperatives. The moral law does not prescribe moral action in order to achieve some end (e.g. the respect of one’s peers, or social collaboration); rather, it prescribes moral action irrespective of the ends that it achieves. This implies that we ought to obey the moral law no matter what our desires or inclinations.
Suppose that I, a rich Westerner, ought to make a contribution to charity to relieve poverty in the developing world, and that I am well aware of this fact. Suppose further that I would like to do so, that I care about the welfare of others and so that making such a donation will make me happy. When I make the donation, it is difficult to tell whether I am doing so out of duty (because I recognise that I ought to) or out of inclination (because I want to).
Kant holds that moral action must result from respect for the moral law. If I give money to charity because I want to, but I lack respect for the moral law and so if I didn’t want to make a donation then I wouldn’t, then in making the donation I am not acting well. My donation is at best benign, and at worst selfish; it is certainly not laudable.
If, on the other, I don’t want to give money to charity, but, because of my strong sense of duty, do so anyway, then this Kant would applaud. I may be mean, selfish, and heartless, but I respect the moral law. In conquering my inclination I have acted well.
Because it is only when we act out of duty and contrary to inclination that our respect for the moral law is clear, such action has a special value for Kant. Indeed, Kant arguably valued such action more highly than action in accordance with both duty and inclination.
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