Objective Utilitarianism
Classical forms of utilitarianism value subjective experiences; hedonistic utilitarianism, for example, holds that morality is all about maximising pleasure and minimising pain. Objective utilitarianism rejects this, holding instead that some things are objectively good or bad for us irrespective of whether or not they make us happy or sad. It is the objective good, rather than pleasure or pain, that we ought to maximise, according to the objective utilitarian.
It certainly seems that there is more to life than just pleasure and pain. Robert Nozick developed a thought-experiment to demonstrate this:
“Suppose there were an experience machine that would give you any experience you desired. Superduper neuropsychologists could stimulate your brain so that you would think and feel you were writing a great novel, or making a friend, or reading an interesting book. All the time you would be floating in a tank, with electrodes attached to your brain. Should you plug into this machine for life, preprogramming your life’s desires?”
Nozick’s machine guarantee’s happiness, which is all that the hedonistic utilitarian wants. There is a price to be paid for this happiness, though: those on the machine never actually do anything more than float in a tank having their brain stimulated. The question we must ask ourselves in order to decide whether we would want to be plugged into such a machine is this: is happiness all that matters, or is it important that we actually do something with our lives?
Plausibly, we should not plug ourselves into Nozick’s experience machine. Most people agree that they would not want the kind of life that it offers. If that is the case, though, then happiness isn’t everything; how our lives actually go matters as well as whether or not we enjoy them. This supports the objective utilitarian’s claim that what is good is an objective, rather than merely a subjective, matter. Objective utilitarianism holds that it is this objective goodness that is to be maximised.
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